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Abstract 
To implement the capabilities conceptualized in the National Military Strategy, 
complex, secure networks of weapon systems, intelligence platforms, and 
command-and-control mechanisms must be seamlessly integrated and maintained 
over time.  Accurate and timely information will enable National Military Strategy key 
tenets to be realized  These networks are central warfighting platforms in the 
information age. 
As these capabilities are developed over time in an evolutionary manner, 
interoperability on the Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) networks is essential, and both 
hardware and software systems must be designed in an Open-systems Architecture 
(OA) fashion to accommodate the vast number of changes anticipated.  Professional 
Program Management will be needed to successfully develop these key warfighting 
platforms. 
Materiel Developers will need to recognize the relatively immature nature of 
the software engineering domains and actively compensate for this immaturity.  
System software performance capabilities must be much more detailed than typical 
hardware-centric systems, as the current state of software engineering disciplines is 
unlikely to satisfy implied, yet critical performance requirements.  Essential OA 
performance characteristics including Maintainability, Upgradability, 
Interfaces/Interoperability, Reliability, Safety and Security (MUIRSS) must be fully 
analyzed and clearly communicated to the software developer to ensure the DoD 
obtains the flexibility and longevity desired from NCW systems. 
Keywords: Net-Centric Warfare, Interoperability, Open Systems Architecture, 
Software Requirements, System-of-Systems, Family of Systems 
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Introduction 
The National Military Strategy is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 
guiding document for development of the future force and warfighting capabilities.  It 
states: 
Agility, decisiveness, and integration support simultaneous operations, the 
application of overmatching power and the fusion of US military power with 
other instruments of power. These principles stress speed, allowing US 
commanders to exploit an enemy’s vulnerabilities, rapidly seize the initiative 
and achieve endstates.  They support the concept of surging capabilities from 
widely dispersed locations to mass effects against an adversary’s centers of 
gravity to achieve objectives.1   
The key word is ”integration,” as it prescribes interoperability requirements to a level 
never before achieved.  Flexible networks of complex system-of-systems must be 
successfully developed to realize this strategic goal. 
To implement the concepts presented in National Military Strategy, the 
Director of Force Transformation anticipates a new era:  
As the world enters a new millennium, our military simultaneously enters a 
new era in warfare—an era in which warfare is affected by a changing 
strategic environment and rapid technological change.  The United States and 
our multinational partners are experiencing a transition from the Industrial Age 
to the Information Age.  Simultaneously, we are fully engaged in a global war 
on terrorism set in a new period of globalization.  These changes, as well as 
the experiences gained during recent and ongoing military operations, have 
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resulted in the current drive to transform the force with network-centric 
warfare (NCW) as the centerpiece of this effort.2   
This quote from The Implementation of Network-centric Warfare clearly indicates the 
direction that the DoD is taking in developing the next generation’s warfighting 
capabilities.  The success of the initial NCW systems deployed since Desert Storm, 
as limited as they were, revealed the potential battlespace domination offered 
through networked systems providing situational and informational superiority.  One 
major challenge in constructing effective NCW systems is designing the network to 
seamlessly integrate existing, planned and future platforms and systems into a 
secure, fully interoperable, near real-time information system.  The network will need 
to accommodate complex systems that may or may not have been designed to 
interoperate.  The networked systems themselves are extremely complex and will 
have been developed decades apart.  The network design must be open, flexible 
and able to adapt to this wide disparity of system-of-systems. 
It is well understood that an Open-systems Architecture (OA) design is 
required to meet both current and future warfighting needs and is a critical element 
in net-centric warfare systems-of-systems concepts.  These highly integrated 
systems are increasingly dependent on software solutions for integration into the 
net-centric scheme; therefore, software interfaces are one of the main keys for 
achieving the tactical and strategic synergies of the net-centric system.  This 
research will focus on the challenges presented when the Department of Defense 
(DoD) conducts capabilities analysis and derives performance specifications for a 
software-intensive, net-centric, system-of-systems architecture that meets OA needs 
throughout the life of the system. 
                                            
2 Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Implementation of Network-
centric Warfare (Washington, DC: author, 5 January 2005), 3. 
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Acquisition Essentials  
You got to be careful if you don’t know where you’re going, because you 
might not get there! – Yogi Berra 
There are several essential steps to successfully develop software-intensive 
systems or any complex system: 
• Warfighter Functional Area Analysis/Functional Need Development 
• Requirements Analysis and Development 
• Communication with Potential Contractors via the RFP 
• Source Selection of the Most Qualified Developer 
• Intensive Management of the Development Effort 
• Testing to Ensure Technical and Warfighter Requirements are Met 
• New System Deployment and Training 
• Effective Post-Deployment Support 
Obviously, each of these steps has myriad activities and events that must be 
conducted to ensure that all facets are adequately addressed.  Each step is 
dependent on how well its predecessor was conducted, recognizing that there is 
significant overlap between them.  This overlapping period is critical to the process 
as the proponent of the preceding step must ensure that there is an excellent 
understanding of critical information needed at the next step and throughout the 
remaining system development and operational support.  The impact of incomplete 
or ill-defined requirements on the following acquisition steps can be devastating, as 
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This research focuses on Requirements Analysis and Development and 
discusses both the input from the Warfighter Need Development step as well as the 
output with regard to the next step: Communication with Potential Contractors via 
the RFP.  To develop the warfighting capability needed, it is obvious that 
requirements must be known; but exactly when and how the software developer 
learns of the total system requirements impacts cost and schedule proposals, as 
well as overall management of the developmental effort.   
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the 
guiding concept for developing warfighters’ capabilities-based requirements.  
Warfighter requirements are communicated in terms of capabilities needed and 
include supportability capabilities, where appropriate.  A series of capabilities 
documents—including Joint Capabilities Document (JCD), Initial Capabilities 
Document (ICD), Capabilities Design Document (CDD), and Capabilities Production 
Document (CPD)—are provided at the program initiation and throughout the system 
development phase to help ensure warfighting capabilities are well understood and 
the system under development satisfies the needed capabilities.  These capabilities 
documents are developed within the framework of environments and constraints 
described in the acronym DOTMLPF—Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 
Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities.   
Because the warfighter requirements are stated in capabilities-based 
language, a significant amount of systems engineering analysis is required to 
transform those user requirements into performance specifications that the potential 
contractors can understand.  The individuals that draft these capabilities documents 
are typically operationally oriented, and the language used reflects that orientation.  
The Materiel Developer must interpret these requirements, providing much more 
detail with derived and implied system performance requirements. 
The DoD Performance Specification development process transforms the 
warfighter requirements into terms that are more understandable for the system 
developer, usually the prime contractor.  Typically, the system performance 
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requirements are decomposed through at least three levels using the Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS) and the Systems Engineering Process (SEP) 
methodology.  The concept is to provide the contractor sufficient detail with regard to 
performance, constraints, and intended environments without stifling innovative 
solutions to meeting those requirements.  The number of WBS levels developed by 
the DoD is dependent on the complexity of the system and the engineering domain 
maturity.  For example, the automotive engineering discipline is very mature, and a 
Level three WBS for a tactical truck system would most probably be sufficient.  To 
determine whether the WBS and resulting performance specification are sufficient 
for the RFP, the Materiel Developer must ensure the contractor has sufficient 
information to develop the system needed by the warfighter.  While easily stated, 
this presents a daunting challenge in complex systems, especially those that are 
software-intensive.  Hardware-oriented engineering environments tend to be very 
mature, allowing developers to apply widely accepted standards for implied 
requirements such as maintainability and the ability to accept future upgrades or 
modifications.  In contrast, software engineering relies almost exclusively on explicit 
requirements to attain the performance and quality attributes needed. 
Software engineering is not mature, and there are few industry-wide 
standards for languages, tools, architectures, reuse, or procedures.  Software 
developed for complex weapon systems is typically started from scratch with each 
new system; very little existing software code is reused.  In addition, new languages 
and associated tools are introduced every few years.  For this and other reasons, 
software programs grow exponentially in size and complexity, expanding desired 
capabilities but limiting the maturation process.  The DoD Materiel Developer must 
recognize the relative immaturity of software engineering when developing the WBS 
and performance specification for software-intensive systems and, more importantly, 
compensate for that immaturity. 
The current state of software engineering maturity drastically impacts an area 
of extreme DoD concern—Supportability.  Hardware-centric performance 
specifications rely heavily on mature engineering environments to account for a 
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significant portion of the system’s supportability performance.  Using the automotive 
engineering example, there is little need of specifying supportability requirements 
such as features for oil, filter, tire and coolant replacement as they are industry-
standard features that would be included in any competent design.  There are few 
corresponding software engineering standards for supportability features, and most 
commercially based software is not designed for long-term use as is typically the 
requirement for DoD systems.  There are literally hundreds of ways to build the 
architecture and construct the code for even the most basic software function.  
Without physical or established engineering techniques, the software developer is 
bounded only by his or her imagination and creativity in satisfying broad 
specifications.  The resulting software may function correctly, but may not possess 
the OA design needed to effectively maintain, upgrade, or interface it with the 
constantly changing net-centric systems and environment. 
DoD acquisition professionals must recognize that the warfighter capabilities 
needed require software development techniques that differ significantly when 
compared to their commercially based counterparts.  The software engineering 
techniques used in short-lived software products may not prove effective in 
developing long-lived DoD software-intensive, warfighting systems.  DoD systems 
are designed to have a very long life span, including software-intensive systems, in 
direct contravention with most commercially based software designs.  The need for 
OA design—upgradeable, flexible, and highly reliable software that is maintainable 
over a long life span—is paramount to DoD’s warfighting systems, but industry-
standard software engineering techniques do not necessarily incorporate those 
features as an industry-wide best practice.  
What this means to the DoD is that the capabilities analysis and resulting 
system performance specifications must be completed in significantly more detail to 
achieve software performance that meets the warfighter’s needs.  The software 
developer needs to be driven to OA design by the WBS and performance 
specifications because software engineering discipline and state of the practice are 
unlikely to provide sufficient architectural designs without explicit performance 
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requirements clearly communicated.  Providing more detailed performance 
specifications seems to run counter to acquisition reforms implemented to allow 
industry flexibility and innovation in achieving performance thresholds and goals, but 
that is not the intent.  The detailed performance specifications provide the software 
developer much more information about areas that the customer—DoD—sees as 
critical to the overall system performance.  This will have a significant impact on the 
system software design supporting OA performance and will provide the basis for a 
much more accurate cost and schedule estimate in the proposal received. 
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Near-Term Challenges 
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to draw resources from the 
DoD transformation effort.  The National Military Strategy explains, “Our challenge in 
the coming year and beyond is to stay the course as we continue to transform our 
Armed Forces to conduct future joint operations.”3  The wartime tempo consumes 
the operational life of existing systems much faster than the typical peacetime 
training tempo, driving the need to maintain and replace current technologies with 
resources that may have been applied to transformation.  In addition, rapidly 
developed systems filling immediate needs, such as countering Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs), compete for the same resources and usually produce 
interim systems that are not designed for integration into future net-centric systems, 
which are the cornerstones for DoD transformation. 
The net-centric warfare concepts feature system-of-systems in an elaborate 
network requiring a significant number of critical interfaces.  As each system is 
added or later upgrades its capabilities, it likely drives an interface change with other 
interfaced systems, necessitating the need for flexibility in accommodating interface 
changes from affected interoperating or networked systems.  It is easy to visualize 
dozens of software changes driven by upgrades in the interfaced components of the 
network and the critical need for effective OA designs to quickly and economically 
accommodate change over a long life span.  The required level of safety and 
security for networked warfighting systems exacerbates the OA design challenge, as 
OA-designed networks are inherently more difficult to secure.  Again, this level of 
design flexibility is not a software industry norm for most commercially designed 
systems.  
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Safety and Security requirements for DoD weapon system software have few 
commercial counterparts.  Obviously, commercially-based critical medical 
equipment, aviation systems, and banking systems would also require a high degree 
of safety and security, but the combat environment weapon systems are intended to 
operate within, and the military lives that are always at stake, add to criticality of the 
need.  The net-centric warfare environment will necessarily require unprecedented 
security measures.  Software must be designed to continue to operate critical 
weapon systems in degraded modes, reject spurious input without freezing or failing, 
and resist intrusion, viruses and other attacks.  Anything short of that will put military 
members and the critical missions they perform at risk.  Most commercially based 
software engineering disciplines do not consider such stringent safety and security 
requirements.  The system’s OA design must allow for the flexibility needed while 
simultaneously ensuring safety and security requirements.  These two forces are 
rarely in concert and usually are in conflict. 
Even without the additional challenges presented by the warfighting 
environment, successfully developing complex, software-intensive systems has 
been extremely problematic.  “In a recent study of 250 software-intensive projects 
with 10,000 or more function points, only about 25 were deemed successful (i.e., 
achieved their initial cost, schedule and performance objectives).”4  In addition, the 
Government Accountability Office (at that time known as the General Accounting 
Office—GAO) reported that a 1999 study performed by the Standish Group 
concluded that the average cost overrun was 189 percent, the average schedule 
overrun was 222 percent, and only 61 percent of software-intensive programs 
delivered their originally specified features or functions.5  The DoD net-centric, 
system-of-systems development will certainly fall into this same category of 
                                            
4 David Cottengim, “Irreducible Truths of Software-intensive Program Management,” Defense 
Acquisition Review Journal 16, no. 1 (December 2005/March 2006): 393. 
5 General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Stronger management practices are needed to 
provide DoD’s software-intensive weapon acquisitions, Report to the Committee on Armed Service, 
US Senate. March 2004, publication no. GAO-04-393, 7. 
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software-intensive systems; and a success rate in the range of 10% is not 
acceptable.  Clearly, each of the steps outlined in the Acquisition Essentials 
paragraph above must be scrutinized, analyzed, planned and intensively managed 
to improve the probability of successfully delivering the warfighting capability 
needed, on time and within budget constraints. 
From a software developer’s point of view, there are further problems with the 
traditional system development model depicted below:6 
Figure 1. Traditional System Development Model 
Start  Operational descriptions 
   High-level functional requirements 
       Legacy systems 
         New systems 
 
  A Miracle Happens 
 
 
     Specific system architecture 
          Software architecture 
      Detail design 
              Implementation 
 
Traditional System Development 
From the software developer point of view, this Traditional System 
Development model obviously leaves a lot to be desired, but indicates the presence 
                                            
6 Mario R. Barbacci et al., Quality Attribute Workshops (QAWs), 3rd ed. August 2003, CMU/SEI-2003-
TR-016, 2. 
Quality attributes are often missing 
from requirements, or are vaguely 
understood and weakly articulated
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of a persistent and fatal flaw—lack of necessary information.  If the requirements 
communicated via the WBS and Performance Specification are missing needed 
quality attributes or those attributes are vaguely understood and weakly articulated, 
a miracle will be needed to design and build the required software-intensive system.  
Requirements elicitation must be completed before the system can be designed and 
developed, so the developer must spend a significant amount of time and resources 
drawing missing requirements and gaining clarifications from the Government 
customer after award of the contract.  That means that the real level of effort needed 
was not known at the time of the proposal or contract award, and proposed cost and 
schedule are likely to be significantly understated, immediately thrusting the program 
into a management crisis. 
A more fully analyzed and developed WBS driving a more detailed 
Performance Specification help address the model deficiencies noted.  The well-
developed WBS provides the high-level functional design; the resulting Performance 
Specification must be analyzed and developed in such a way to include all 
necessary quality attributes articulated in clearly understood terms.  The following 
analysis methodology provides a framework and process that will help provide 
software developers the necessary guidance to accurately propose, design and 
develop the capabilities needed by the warfighter within predictable and manageable 
resource limitations.   
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A Methodology for Software OA Capabilities 
Analysis 
For DoD software-intensive systems to attain the broad spectrum of 
warfighter performance and long-term supportability with predictable costs and 
schedules, the Materiel Developer must provide performance specifications in the 
RFP that are detailed in areas that hardware-centric systems with mature 
engineering environments need not be.  In addition to the system’s software 
performance issues, the OA areas of Maintainability, Upgradeability, 
Interfaces/Interoperability, Reliability, Safety, and Security (MUIRSS) must be 
carefully analyzed to ensure the potential contractors understand the Government 
requirements and constraints in each of these areas.  It is likely that the WBS will 
have to be developed several more levels deep in order to capture essential 
requirements; potential contractors would need to see such WBS development to 
form a realistic proposal with an executable schedule and an accurate cost estimate. 
Work Breakdown System (WBS) Development 
Supporting Proposal Realism and Software Design 
The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) is a cornerstone for the Government 
“to structurally illustrate a clear understanding of the technical objectives and the end 
items or end products of the work to be performed by both Government and contract 
entities.”7  The WBS serves as the system functional design description at the top 
levels and transitions to be the system’s detail design at the lower levels.  The 
Program WBS developed by the Materiel Developer conveys system functional 
elements considered critical for potential contractors to understand in order to build a 
system that is effective and suitable for the warfighter.  This WBS Program level is 
very much a functional depiction of the system and is designed to provide potential 
                                            
7 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Handbook, “Work Breakdown Structures for 
Defense Materiel Items,” 30 July  2005, MIL-HDBK-881A, 9. 
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contractors with a very good understanding of the level of effort needed to build the 
system. 
For software-intensive systems, extending the program WBS development 
beyond Level 3 will be required to sufficiently convey details of performance 
necessary for prospective contractors to accurately estimate cost and schedule for a 
more realistic proposal.  In part, this is driven by the net-centric and system-of-
systems warfare concept, so the interfacing and network environments become a 
critical part of the WBS.  The characterization of WBS Level 1 is transforming from 
an individual system description to a description of the network, as developed 
systems are part of larger network-centric and system-of-systems.  “A SoS [system-
of-systems] WBS is driven by the need to capture the common elements that 
support the integration of various systems into the SoS.”8  The system-of-systems or 
network description becomes WBS Level 1 for all subsystems developed, and the 
WBS Level 3 provides very limited information regarding the functional design 
actually needed.  In this environment, the WBS Level 3 was the previous 
generation’s Level 2 as the network environment is correctly added on at the top 
level. 
As the WBS is developed, it becomes the basis for system specifications.  
“This function includes developing the system specification, functional specifications, 
or a set of configuration items through requirements analysis, functional analysis and 
allocation, synthesis and systems analysis and controls.”9  For the Program level of 
WBS, this clearly indicates that each WBS level is developed using a Systems 
Engineering Process (SEP) approach, eventually producing the essential system 
functions to be included in the performance specifications.  These Performance 
Specifications are important portions of the Request for Proposal (RFP), providing 
critical information for potential contractors in formulating the proposed schedule and 
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cost to develop and produce.  The successful contractor will continue to develop the 
WBS into the detailed specifications that define the system architecture and design.   
Proposal realism is linked with how clearly the RFP and integral Performance 
Specification convey the level of work necessary; likewise, the detail provided in the 
Performance Specification is linked with the Program WBS development.  “A WBS 
can be expressed to any level.  However, the top three levels are the minimum 
recommended any program or contract needs for reporting purposes unless the 
items identified are high cost or high risk.  Then, and only then, is it critical to define 
the product at a lower level of WBS detail.”10  Software development within the 
immature engineering environment continues to be a risky process, and software-
intensive systems are almost always high-cost, so consideration for developing 
supporting WBS below Level 3 should be automatic.   
Considering the state of immature software engineering that exists today, it is 
clear the DoD will not achieve proposal realism nor the level of software-intensive 
system performance necessary if the WBS and performance specification are not 
developed more fully before hand-off to the developer or contractor.  Due to the 
pressure to shorten the acquisition timeline, there is a tendency to rush the Request 
for Proposal (RFP) to the prospective contractors without developing the WBS below 
Level 3 or including the performance specification with sufficient detail.  This 
approach works with systems based in mature engineering environments as the 
contractor understands that all of those unstated requirements will be satisfied 
through the established engineering standards; thus, the proposed schedule and 
cost estimates will be fairly accurate.  With a software-intensive system, however, 
this is not the case due to many of the reasons presented earlier.  The most diligent 
contractor can only provide cost and schedule estimates based on what is presented 
in the RFP.  If a significant portion of the software development effort is not evident 
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in the RFP, the contractor estimates may be grossly understated, causing 
substantial—and avoidable—funding shortfalls and schedule overruns that plague 
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MUIRSS Quality Attribute Analysis Technique 
The Systems Engineering Process (SEP) is the preferred technique for 
analysis within each of the MUIRSS categories as it provides a highly structured and 
comprehensive methodology for developing the WBS.  This will be a key tool for the 
DoD Materiel Developer in developing capabilities requirements and communicating 
them to the software developer via the performance specifications.  Recognizing the 
existing shortfalls in software engineering maturity, this methodology will greatly 
assist the software developer in understanding OA-related performance 
requirements; this, in turn, will significantly influence the software architecture design 
and the level of effort estimated to build the desired system.  The alternative leaves 
the software developer estimating these requirements without the background or 
experience to do so, or worse yet, discovering the extent of the actual requirements 
after the work has begun. 
The capabilities analysis process must capture the OA performance needed 
for supporting the system throughout its lifecycle.  This analysis should drive a 
robust Post Production Software Support (PPSS) plan and Computer Resources Life 
Cycle Management Plan (CRLCMP) addressing the MUIRSS elements of the OA 
design.  The MUIRSS elements are interdependent and tend to apply across the 
system and software architecture.  Each MUIRSS element is discussed in the 
following paragraphs to provide a basis for analyzing capability requirements within 
the area and capturing performance characteristics that are essential to the DoD. 
Maintainability 
The amount of elapsed time between initial fielding and the first required 
software maintenance action can probably be measured in hours, not days.  The 
effectiveness and efficiency of these required maintenance actions is dependent on 
several factors, but the software architecture that was developed from the 
performance specifications provided is critical.  The DoD must influence the software 
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architecture through the performance specification process to minimize the cost and 
time required to perform essential maintenance tasks. 
Maintenance is one area where software is fundamentally different from 
hardware.  Software is one of the very few components where we know that the 
fielded product has shortcomings, and we field it anyway.  There are a number of 
reasons why this happens; for instance, there typically is not enough time, funding or 
resources to find and correct every error, glitch, or bug, and not every one is worth 
the effort of correcting.  Knowing this, there must be a sound plan and resources 
immediately available to quickly correct those shortcomings that do surface during 
testing and especially those that arise during warfighting operations.  Even when the 
system software is operating well, changes and upgrades in other, interfaced 
hardware and software systems will drive some sort of software maintenance action 
to the system software. In other words, there will be a continuous need for software 
maintenance in the planned complex system-of-systems architecture envisioned for 
net-centric warfare.   
Because the frequency of required software maintenance actions is going to 
be much higher than in other systems, the cost to perform these tasks is likely to be 
higher as well.  One of the reasons for this is that software is not maintained by 
”maintainers,” as are most hardware systems, but is maintained by the same type of 
people that originally developed it—software engineers.  These engineers will be 
needed immediately upon fielding, and a number will be needed throughout the 
lifespan of the system to perform maintenance, add capabilities, and upgrade the 
system. There are several models available to estimate the number of software 
engineers that will be needed for support; planning for funding these resources must 
begin very early in the process.  As the DoD has a very limited capability for 
supporting software internally, typically, early software support is provided by the 
original developer and is included in the RFP and proposal for inclusion into the 
contract or as a follow-on Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) contract. 
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Upgradeability  
A net-centric environment composed of numerous systems developed in an 
evolutionary acquisition model will create an environment of almost continuous 
change as each system upgrades its capabilities over time.  System software will 
have to accommodate the changes and will have to, in turn, be upgraded to leverage 
the consistently added capabilities.  The software architecture design will play a 
major role in how effective and efficient capabilities upgrades are implemented, so 
communicating the known, anticipated and likely system upgrades will impact how 
the software developer designs the software for known and unknown upgrades. 
Trying to anticipate upgrade requirements for long-lived systems is extremely 
challenging to Materiel Developers, but is well worth their effort.  Unanticipated 
software changes in the operational support phase cost 50 to 200 times the cost in 
early design; so, any software designed to accommodate an upgrade that is never 
realized costs virtually nothing when compared to changing software later for a 
capability that could have been anticipated.  For example, the Army Tactical Missile 
System (ATACMS) Unitary was a requirement to modify the missile from warhead 
air delivery to surface detonation—that is, flying the warhead to the ground.  The 
contract award was for $119 million for the modification. The warhead was not new 
technology, nor particularly challenging to integrate with the missile body.  The vast 
majority of this cost was to reengineer the software to guide the missile to the 
surface.  Had there been an upgrade requirement for this type of mission in the 
original performance specification, this original cost (including potential upgrades, 
even if there were ten other upgrade requirements that were never applied) would 
have been a fraction of this modification cost. 
Interfaces/Interoperability 
OA design focuses on the strict control of interfaces to ensure the maximum 
flexibility in adding or changing system modules, whether they are hardware or 
software in nature.  This presupposes that the system modules are known—which 
seems logical, as most hardware modules are well defined and bounded by both 
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physics and mature engineering standards.  In sharp contrast to hardware, software 
modularity is not bounded by physics, and there are very few software industry 
standards for the modular architecture in software components.  This is yet another 
area where the software developer needs much more information about operational, 
maintenance, reliability, safety and security performance requirements, as well as 
current, planned and potential system upgrades.  These requirements, once well-
defined and clearly communicated, will drive the developer to design a software 
modular architecture supporting OA performance goals.  For example, if a system 
uses a Global Positioning System (GPS) signal, it is likely that the GPS will change 
over the life of the system.  Knowing this, the software developer creates a 
corresponding discrete software module that is much easier and less expensive to 
interface, change and upgrade as the GPS system does so. 
With the system software modular architecture developed, the focus returns 
to the interfaces between hardware and software modules, as well as to the external 
interfaces needed for the desired interoperability of the net-centric force.  Software 
is, of course, one of the essential enablers for interoperability and provides a 
powerful tool for interfacing systems, including systems that were not designed to 
work together.  Software performing the function of ”middleware” allows legacy and 
other dissimilar systems to interoperate.  Obviously, this interoperation provides a 
significant advantage, but comes with a cost in the form of maintainability, resources 
and system complexity.  As software interfaces with other components and actually 
performs the interface function, controlling it and ensuring the interfaces provide the 
desired OA capability becomes a major software-management and software-
discipline challenge.   
One method being employed by the DoD attempts to control the critical 
interfaces through a set of parameters or protocols rather than active management 
of the network and network environment.  This method falls short on several levels.  
It fails to understand and control the effects of aggregating all of the systems in a 
net-centric scheme.  For instance, each individual system may meet all protocols for 
bandwidth, but when all systems are engaged on the network, all bandwidth 
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requirements are aggregated on the network—overloading the total bandwidth 
available for all systems.  In addition, members of the Software Engineering Institute 
(SEI) noted: 
While these standards may present a step in the right direction, they are 
limited in the extent to which they facilitate interoperability.  At best, they 
define a minimal infrastructure that consists of products and other standards 
on which systems can be based.  They do not define the common message 
semantics, operational protocols, and system execution scenarios that are 
needed for interoperation.  They should not be considered system 
architectures.  For example, the C4ISR domain-specific information (within 
the JTA) identifies acceptable standards for fiber channels and radio 
transmission interfaces, but does not specify the common semantics of 
messages to be communicated between C4ISR systems, nor does it define 
an architecture for a specific C4ISR system or set of systems.11 
Clearly, understanding and controlling the interfaces is critical for effective 
interoperation at both the system and system-of-systems levels.  The individual 
program manager must actively manage all systems’ interfaces impacting OA 
performance, and a network PM must do the same for the critical network interfaces.  
Due to this necessity of constant management, a parameters-and-protocols 
approach to net-centric OA performance is unlikely to produce the capabilities and 
functionality expected by the warfighter. 
Understanding the software interfaces begins with the software architecture; 
controlling the interfaces is a unique challenge encompassing the need to integrate 
legacy and dissimilar systems and the lack of software interface standards within the 
existing software engineering environment.  As stated earlier, the architecture needs 
to be driven through detailed performance specifications, which will help define the 
                                            
11 Edwin Morris et al., System of Systems Interoperability (SOSI): Final Report (Pittsburg, PA: 
Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, April 2004), 38. 
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interfaces to be controlled.  An effective method for controlling the interfaces is to 
intensely manage a well-defined Interface Control Document (ICD), which should be 
a Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) deliverable on any software-intensive or 
networked system.  
Reliability 
While the need for highly reliable weapon systems is obvious, the impact on 
total system reliability of integrating complex software components is not so obvious.  
Typically, as system complexity increases, maintaining system reliability becomes 
more of a challenge.  Add the complexity of effectively networking a system-of-
systems (all of which are individually complex) to a critical warfighting capability that 
is constantly evolving over time, and reliability becomes daunting. 
Once again, the software developer must have an understanding of reliability 
requirements before crafting the software architecture and developing the software 
applications.  Highly reliable systems often require redundant capability, and this 
holds true for software components as well.  In addition, software problems tend to 
propagate, resulting in a degradation of system reliability over time.  For example, a 
Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 suffered several flight control problems resulting in: a 
near stall situation, contradicting instrument indications, false warnings, and difficulty 
controlling the aircraft in both autopilot and manual flight modes.  The problem was 
traced to software in an air data inertial reference unit that was feeding erroneous 
data to the aircraft’s primary flight computer (PFC), which is used in both autopilot 
and manual flight modes.  The PFC continued to try to correct for the erroneous data 
received, adjusting flight control surfaces in all modes of flight, displaying indications 
that the aircraft was approaching stall speed and overspeed limits simultaneously, 
and causing wind shear alarms to sound close to landing.12  It is critical for system 
reliability that the software developers understand how outputs from software 
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applications are used by interfaced systems so that appropriate reliability safeguards 
can be engineered into the developed software.   
Software that freezes or shuts down the system when an anomaly occurs is 
certainly not reliable nor acceptable for critical weapon systems; yet, these 
characteristics are prevalent in commercially based software systems.  Mission 
reliability is a function of the aggregation of the system’s subcomponent reliability, so 
every software subcomponent is contributing to or detracting from that reliability.  
The complexity of software makes understanding all failure modes nearly 
impossible, but there are many techniques that software developers can employ 
when designing the architecture and engineering the applications to improve the 
software component reliability.  Once requirements are clearly communicated to the 
developers, the software can be engineered with redundancy or ”safe mode” 
capabilities to vastly improve mission reliability when anomalies occur.  The key is 
identifying the reliability requirements and making them clear to the software 
developers. 
Safety 
Very few software applications have the required safety margins associated 
with critical weapon systems used by warfighters in combat situations—where they 
are depending on these margins for their survival.  Typically, the software 
developers have only a vague idea of what their software is doing and how critical 
that function is to the warfighter employing the weapon system.  Safety performance 
must be communicated to the software developers from the beginning of 
development so they have the link between software functionality and systems 
safety.  For example, suppose a smart munition senses that it does not have control 
of a critical directional component, and it calculates that it cannot hit the intended 
target.  The next set of instructions the software provides to the malfunctioning 
system may well be critical to the safety of friendly troops, so software developers 
must have the necessary understanding of operational safety to decide how to code 
the software for what will happen next.   
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Software safety is clearly linked with reliability, as software that is more 
reliable is inherently safer.  It is critical that the software developer understands how 
the warfighter expects the software to operate in abnormal situations, degraded 
modes, and when inputs are outside of expected values.  Much commercially based 
software simply ceases to function under these conditions or gives error messages 
that supercede whatever function was being performed, none of which are 
acceptable in combat operations. 
Security 
With software performing so many critical functions, there is little doubt that 
software applications are a prime target for anyone opposing US and Allied forces.  
Critical weapon system and networking software must be resistant to hacking, 
spoofing, mimicking, and all other manner of attack.  There must be capabilities of 
isolating attacks and portions of networks that have been compromised without 
losing the ability to continue operations in critical combat situations.  The software 
developer must know all these capabilities are essential before he/she constructs 
software architectures and software programs, as this knowledge will be very 
influential for the software design and application development.  Software 
Engineering Institute’s Quality Attribute Workshop states, “As an example, consider 
security.  It is difficult, maybe even impossible, to add effective security to a system 
as an afterthought.  Component as well as communication mechanisms and paths 
must be designed or selected early in the lifecycle to satisfy security requirements.”13 
Interoperability challenges are increased when the system-of-systems have 
the type of security requirements needed by the DoD.  Legacy systems and existing 
security protocols will likely need to be considered before other security architecture 
can be effectively designed.  OA capabilities will be hampered by the critical need for 
security; both must be carefully balanced to optimize system performance and 
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security.  This balance of OA and security must be managed by the DoD and not the 
software developer. 
Physical security schemes and operating procedures will also have an impact 
on the software architecture.  For example, many communication security 
(COMSEC) devices need only routine security until the keys, usually software 
programs, are applied; then, much more stringent security procedures are 
implemented.  Knowledge of this security feature would be a key requirement of the 
developer; he/she must understand how and when the critical software pieces are 
uploaded to the COMSEC device.  The same holds true for weapon systems that 
upload sensitive mission data just prior to launch. 
Residual software on equipment or munitions that could fall into enemy hands 
presents another type of security challenge that needs to be addressed during the 
application development.  For example, the ATACMS missile air-delivers some of its 
warheads, leaving the missile body to freefall to the surface.  It is very conceivable 
that the body could be intact and, of course, unsecured.  If critical mission software 
was still within the body and found by enemy forces, valuable information may be 
gleaned from knowing how the system finds its targets.  We would certainly want the 
developer to design the applications in a way that would make anything recovered 
useless to the enemy, but this is a capability that is not intuitive to the software 
developers. 
Network Development 
The network is a lynchpin for the combat effectiveness of NCW architecture, 
and as such, should be developed under a professional Program Management (PM) 
organization.  The US Navy has achieved optimal results by assigning a PM for the 
Link 16 Program as noted by SEI: “The Navy created a PMO and funded it with 
money from affected programs.  These monies were returned to programs 
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specifically to work toward Link 16 capability.”14  SEI goes on to describe the need 
for professional program management by stating, “What is needed are processes 
that help to reach agreements, blinders that avoid getting distracted by things that 
are not related (e.g., portability), and to be agnostic about specific technologies (e.g., 
CORBA or Message Oriented Middleware).”15  A network PM would help facilitate 
and broker those agreements to the benefit of the network, vastly increasing the 
probability that the NCW asset will provide the warfighter the capability and 
advantage visualized by DoD. 
 
                                            
14 Edwin Morris et al., System of Systems Interoperability (SOSI): Final Report (Pittsburg, PA: 
Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, April 2004), 33. 
15 Ibid., 34.  
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Summary 
To get the needed Open Architecture performance the DoD is seeking for 
software components, the Material developer will have to specify it in the RFP and 
Performance Specification.  Unlike many hardware-centric engineering 
environments, the immature software engineering environment is unlikely to 
compensate for essential performance that is not specified.  With the Materiel 
Developer performing the capabilities analysis using the MUIRSS approach outlined 
above, the potential software developers will be provided a much more detailed 
understanding of critical capabilities the DoD expects from its software components. 
This same technique should result in significantly more accurate proposals as 
much more of the software development work can be estimated from the RFP and 
Performance Specification provided.  Yes, proposals will likely continue to be overly 
optimistic, especially in a competitive environment.  And yes, changes and details 
will still be revealed after the contract is signed—but the cost growth should be in the 
range of ten percent of the cost, not the current average of one-hundred percent of 
the original proposal.  Schedule estimates will also be much more accurate as the 
scope of the software work is better understood by the contractors, keeping 
schedule slippage to under fifteen percent of the original proposal estimate. 
Conducting this analysis will be as challenging as it is time-consuming, 
especially since it is applied in the early stages of the acquisition process when there 
is great pressure to “get the RFP on the street.”  Yet, the enormous potential time 
and cost savings realized throughout the remaining development and the system’s 
lifecycle by completing the thorough MUIRSS capability analysis warrants the 
needed analysis time.  There is an old carpenter’s adage that applies well in this 
case: “measure twice, cut once.” 
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